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Injunctions as a legal weapon in collective industrial disputes in Britain, 2005-2014 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the frequency, nature and outcomes of employers seeking injunctions against 
strikes and industrial action mounted by unions between 2005 and 2014. The number of actual and 
threatened applications continues to be relatively high compared with the previous period when 
strike levels were significantly higher, with employers continuing to gain overwhelmingly successful 
outcomes. Yet usage is increasingly concentrated in a small number of industrial sectors, suggesting 
the notion of ‘strike effectiveness’ provides the best means by which to explain their relative 
frequency and presence. Comparative analysis with Ireland highlights the specificity of the nature of 
British legal regulation of employer seeking injunctive relief. 
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Injunctions as a legal weapon in collective industrial disputes in Britain, 2005-2014 
 
Introduction 
 
The regulation of industrial action in Britain, especially through employer applications for injunctions 
to prevent and end strikes, has become an increasingly political ‘hot potato’. For labour, it has been 
claimed new interpretations of legislation, made during adjudications for injunctions, have greatly 
lessened unions’ ability to organise lawful action. In the March 2011 edition of its magazine, the Rail, 
Maritime and Transport (RMT) union’s general secretary, Bob Crow, claimed had an injunction won 
by Serco not been overturned on appeal, it ‘would have more or less completely banned the right to 
strike’. For capital, calls have been made from bodies like the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
to raise thresholds for lawful mandates for industrial action because, it argued, too many strikes 
proceed with insufficient membership ballot support. Acting upon its 2015 election manifesto, in the 
form of the Trade Union Bill, the Conservative Party has proposed new thresholds for strike 
mandates, comprising i) a minimum voting turnout of half of eligible members, and ii) at least 40% of 
all those entitled to vote voting for action in health, education, fire and transport, meaning non-
voters become ‘no’ voters. The Trades Union Congress (press releases 12 May 2015, 16 December 
2015) described these changes as making ‘legal strikes close to impossible’ and data showing a 74% 
decline in days ‘lost’ to strikes over the previous year ‘highlight[ed] once again the flimsiness of the 
government’s case’ while the Institute of Employment Rights (Morning Star 28 May 2015) believed 
they represented ‘an open invitation to employers and courts to interfere and delay legitimate 
industrial disputes’. In this context, this article presents data on the frequency and outcome of 
employer applications for injunctions, and threats thereof, between 2005 and 20141, and considers 
their outcomes and sectoral and union distribution. While injunctions continue to be applied for by 
employers, the relative frequency of doing so has declined in the period under study. Yet threats of 
applications have increased markedly. Then the notion of ‘strike effectiveness’ is used to explain why 
injunctions are still applied for or threatened, especially within a narrow array of sectors and 
situations. Finally, comparison with Ireland highlights the specificity of British regulation of 
employers seeking injunctive relief.  
 
Legal regulation, industrial action and industrial relations 
 
Traditionally, Britain’s industrial relations have commonly been characterised as voluntarist, 
comprising relative legal abstention, with primacy given to self-regulating employment relations 
through collective bargaining. This system ended over a period from the late 1960s onwards, with 
increased state intervention regulating unions and their activities in order to weaken this voluntarist 
socialised goverance and then provide individual legal rights with the aim of re-establishing 
managerial control as a route to economic efficiency (as per neo-liberalism). This trajectory was not 
much altered by Labour government (1997-2010) reforms. Although involving significant rupture, 
further legislative regulation of industrial action introduced by Conservative governments (1979-
1997) was based upon making the legal immunities afforded to unions in contemplation or 
furtherance of trade disputes2 – originally established in the Trade Disputes Act 1906 - increasingly 
conditional and subject to higher penalties for transgressions. Consequently, a key hallmark of the 
British system continues to be state provision for private remedy by directly involved aggrieved 
parties, namely, employers, to seek injunctive relief to prevent or end industrial action. Applications 
for injunctions are applications for interim relief, namely, temporary orders granted to compel 
unions to desist from organising industrial action (strikes, industrial action short of a strike (IASOS)) 
pending a full hearing of the legal issues at a later date when the injunction can be confirmed or 
rescinded. With the interim injunction, the burden of proof is less onerous, merely focusing upon 
whether an arguable case exists and potential harm to employers is such that award of damages 
would not be a sufficient remedy. Ex parte hearings are exceptional.   
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In its essentials, the legal framework governing injunctions remains unchanged since the early 1990s 
despite governments of different hues and various changes (legislative or case law). Thus, simplifying 
requirements concerning ballots and notices, and successful appeals in 2011 by the RMT (versus 
Serco) and ASLEF (versus London & Birmingham Railways) against the granting of injunctions on the 
basis of minor errors have not altered the fundamental framework by which the law operates. This 
concerns detailed requirements on balloting for action and notification of balloting, its result and 
intended action. That is not say that, for example, the Employment Relations Act 2004 simplifying 
provisions on the details of balloted members and aforementioned appeals have been unimportant 
in providing unions with some confidence that taking reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy and 
integrity of their internal administrative procedures and membership data will suffice in court. 
Rather, it is to argue the basic regulations of the original framework remain in place, and even where 
subsequent jurisprudence results in a) unforeseen outcomes undermining of the intended spirit of 
the new provisions (as was the case with the amendment of sections 226A and 234A of the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidated) Act 1992 by the Employment Relations Act 1999 with 
regard to specifying categories and names of workers being balloted); and b) the overturning of 
what were regarded as established precedents (which allowed for errors or imprecision that did not 
materially affect ballot outcomes or validity of employer notices), this remains the case as these only 
affect the margins. Consequently, the terrain for judging the frequency of applications and threats, 
alongside the basis upon which they are made, has remained level in both shorter (2005-2014) and 
longer (1995-2004) timeframes.  
 
The canvass upon which employers can apply for injunctions comprises not merely strikes and IASOS 
but also potential and intended cases as a result of ballot mandates (which run roughly at five times 
strike level as Table 1 indicates). In order to maintain legal immunity, unions are required to secretly 
(postal) ballot appropriate members according to specified regulation and similarly notify employers 
of the ballot, the ballot constituency, forms of action, then the detailed ballot result and, with due 
notice, which members are taking what action, where, when and for how long. Allegations of 
deficiency in some aspect provide grounds for applications for injunctions or make threats to. The 
following examples of injunctions, where no material difference was made to mandates’ validity by 
the errors, highlight the acute way in which courts have applied the legislative framework: in 2007, a 
Royal Mail strike was injuncted because the union did not tell the employer exactly how many 
employees were employed; in 2008, a Metrobus drivers’ strike was injuncted because the union 
took too long (48 hours) to fax the ballot result to the employer; in 2009, a British Airways (BA)  
strike was injucted because some members had already agreed to take voluntary redundancy; and in 
2010, a Milford Haven port strike was injuncted because the notice of ‘discontinuous’ and 
‘continuous’ action was given on one, not two sheets of paper (see also Dukes (2010, 2011), Prassl 
(2011) and Simpson (2013) on these and other recent cases). The paucity of unofficial (i.e., 
unballoted) strikes and IASOS (Gall and Cohen 2013:94-98) means statistics on mandates for (official) 
strike and industrial action give a far better indication of the canvas’s size than the number of strikes 
and cases of IASOS (even though a large proportion of mandates are neither implemented nor 
threatened to be).  
 
Finally, while adjudication of injunctions is a matter of law, the decision to litigate – or to threaten to 
- is largely a matter of industrial relations.3 Thus, employer behaviour is essentially a matter of 
collective bargaining, for applications - or threats - represent attempts to gain leverage in order to 
instil changed perspectives so as to settle disputes on terms favourable to employers. Employers’ 
attempts to do so are credible because employers gain most of the injunctions they seek and the 
consequences of defying injunctions by being held in contempt of court are considerable in financial 
and political terms. The point is emphasised for, almost without exception, employers do not return 
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to court seeking injunctions become permanent because their immediate objective in preventing or 
stopping the industrial action has been gained.4  
 
Table 1 here 
 
Methodology 
 
Data is drawn from various secondary sources, being media releases and publications from unions, 
and reporting in the quality press, comprising local, regional and national ‘broadsheets’. Although 
not duplicates, there is some overlap between the two given unions are the keenest party to 
publicise employers sought and/or gained injunctions and newspapers seldom now employ labour 
correspondents to independently generate such stories. Reporting of injunctions usually contains 
employer statements confirming essential facts and basic rationale. Specialist sources such as law 
reports,5 employment law and personnel media, and the radical press (like Socialist Worker, Morning 
Star) were also used because unions have not always publicised applications against them – often 
because their mistakes gave employers the latitude. The three sources were used to achieve a basic 
level of corroboration. Unions themselves were not approached directly because of previous 
experience in gaining a significant degree of non-response and incomplete response (judged by 
cases reported compared to those gathered by the author) as a result of the information not being 
held in a single repository. Moreover, it was not as simple as merely asking unions’ legal or research 
departments for details of injunctions (or threats). Indeed, some unions responded by advising their 
websites for press releases should be consulted. Attempts to correspond with a selection of 
employers on the dynamics and dimensions of why they sought injunctions proved unproductive. 
Judged by what response was gained, their unwillingness to respond stemmed from public 
sensitivity to discussing matters with outside, third parties and their desire to ‘move on’ from this 
aspect of the past while their inability stemmed from changes in personnel leading to a loss of 
knowledge and absence of suitable records which could be publicly released. For reasons of client 
confidentiality, approaches to lawyers acting for employers were no more successful.6  
 
Nonetheless, the data has a high but not total degree of completeness on applications for 
injunctions (and their essential characteristics) for while not all applications will have been identified 
given the weakness of the aforementioned union sources and declining media focus upon industrial 
relations, because the number of applications for injunctions in absolute terms is relatively low, and 
the media tends to concentrates upon the conflictual aspects of industrial relations like strikes. 
However, concerning threats to apply, the degree of completeness is likely to be less for not all 
threats are reported by unions or media. For unions, this is because highlighting the threat is often 
seen as either a diversion from the tasks at hand or of no help in gaining objectives. For the media, 
the threat is not necessarily regarded as newsworthy because a strike – which is seen as newsworthy 
– is not yet in close prospect.  
 
The distinction between threatening to apply and applying for injunctions requires elaboration. The 
former comprises making threats prior to initiating proceedings to apply as well as initiating 
proceedings themselves. Only when the process for hearing the application has begun, with papers 
served on unions, does the threat end and become an actuality. At any point in the process from 
making a threat to the court’s decision upon adjudication, employers can withdraw their threats to 
apply or the application itself. Recorded threats were not deemed ‘empty’ or ‘vague’ but sufficiently 
‘serious’ and ‘specific’ judged by union response. Thus, even where unions continued with ballots or 
action, they took lawyer’s advice on employers’ threats - rather than dismiss them out of hand as 
bluster - and advice was considered by senior officers or senior union committees.  
 
Frequency, outcomes, grounds and sectors  
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The years 2005-2014 (Table 2) continued the decline in the number of applications for injunctions, 
with 65 compared to 78 from 1995-2004. The 1980s saw 136 applications while the 1990s 97 and 
2000s 61. The first half of the 2010s saw 34 applications. Put another way, the first high point was 
1984-1986 with 68 applications followed by lower spikes of 38 (1989-1991) and 41 (1994-1996). The 
spike of the last decade was 2009-2011 with 31 applications. Falling applications (and threats to 
apply) after 2011 is heavily related to case law developments (see below). As with 1995-2004, the 
overwhelming majority of applications (and threats to apply) concern strikes and not IASOS.7  
 
Table 2 here 
 
Of the 65 applications (Appendix 1), 36 (55%) were granted and 21 (32%) were rejected with all but 
one of the remainder being withdrawn at some point between the beginning of the hearing and 
before judgment as result of the action being ended, stood down or negotiations resolving disputes. 
There were seven appeals against injunctions, with 71% were successful. In only 12 cases did unions 
reballot after injunctions were granted and in only two cases were strikes then forthcoming (with 
one planned but called off due to successful negotiations).8 Between 1995 and 2004, 72% of 
applications were granted (with 6% overturned on appeal), 17% rejected and 9% withdrawn after 
applications were heard but before judgment (see Gall 2006:332). There were five cases of 
reballoting (in which only one case of action was then forthcoming). Such outcomes cast doubt on 
union claims of there being ‘no right to strike’ even though employers gained positive outcomes in 
well over two thirds (those granted, those withdrawn) of injunctions applied for during 2005-2014 
(albeit this was down from 80% during 1995-2004).  
 
Dividing the known grounds (n=66) for applications into six categories (strike notices; balloting 
process and ballot notices; existence of a trade dispute; matters relating breach of picketing 
regulations; others such as unballoted and unlawful action; and unknown) reveals 54% concerned 
balloting process and ballot notices. Reasons here concerned not all required members being 
balloted, inappropriate members being balloted, and deficiencies in information on those to be 
balloted and likewise deficiencies regarding the notification of results of those balloted. Issues 
relating to strikes notices (see before) accounted for 9% of grounds, trade disputes 3%, picketing 8%, 
others 14% and unknown reasons 12%. Using a re-categorisation of the 71 grounds cited between 
1996 and 2004 (Gall 2006), strike notices accounted for 28%, balloting 24%, others (unballoted and 
unlawful action) 20%, and trade disputes 18%. This confirms employer focus has shifted towards 
balloting and away from strike notices and trade disputes in line with case law developments (see 
below). But it also confirms there has been less need-cum-opportunity for employers to seek 
injunctions on the basis of unballoted actions. 
 
By sectoral distribution, 51% of applications concerned transport, with the majority found within rail 
(45%) and bus (36%) sub-sectors. Communications provided 12% (with 75% of concerning Royal 
Mail) and manufacturing 11%. The prison service accounted for 8% with the public sector (including 
prisons but not London Underground and Royal Mail) providing 18%. Compared to 1995-2004, this 
represents a further narrowing of sectors in which applications occurred as a result of a decline in 
applications in the public sector (local government and education especially) and a rise in 
applications in bus transport. The level of dominance of applications on the railways (underground, 
overground) has been maintained with the significance of particular organisations upheld, namely, 
London Underground, Royal Mail, prison service and the (nine) train operating companies. This 
narrowing elevates consideration of individual organisations’ industrial relations climates as an 
explanatory variable. For example, banning industrial action in prisons, without the recourse of 
compulsory arbitration, has not led the absence of injunctions. Rather, they have been used to 
enforce the ban when action has been taken to oppose, in the main, government pay and staffing 
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policies. Meanwhile, the marked decline of Royal Mail injunctions after 2009 results from 
negotiation of extended no-disruption agreements in return for pay rises in preparation for staged 
privatisation. The absence of injunctions in mining reflects primarily the industry’s decimation since 
the early 1990s (with the closure of the last pit in 2015). The relative absence of injunctions in 
manufacturing - given its often high union density and prevalence of strike-prone specialised 
component production and ‘just-in-time’ systems – highlights the extent of employment insecurity 
due to recessionary and competitive forces. Paucity of injunctions in construction indicates employer 
inability to injunct strikes and picketing because they are often not organised by unions (see Gall 
2012).9 Meantime, the health sector continues to be affected by partnership working and loyalty to 
patients, making industrial action less likely. Elsewhere, the private services sector is sufficiently 
poorly unionized (see BIS 2015) as to preclude much industrial action to possibly injunct.  Related to 
the sectoral distribution, the most affected unions between 2005 and 2014 were Unite (and its 
predecessor, the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU)) with 26 applications, RMT (14) and 
Communications Workers’ Union (CWU), Aslef train drivers’ union, the GMB general union and 
Prison Officers’ Association (POA) (either 5 or 6 each). These five unions accounted for 88% of all 
affected unions. Unite’s dominance results from its presence as the largest union across a number of 
sectors, especially in transport and manufacturing while RMT’s position results from it being a small 
union operating in the transport sector with a strategy of strike mobilization to pursue enhanced 
remuneration. 
 
Turning to threats of application (Appendix 2), there were 51 in the nine years of 1996-2004 but 92 
in the ten years of 2005-2014, representing absolute and relative (annual averages: 5.7, 9.2) 
increases. In 56% of cases employers gained a positive outcome (ballot halted, action not taken or 
ended) where 27% of these cases led to reballoting but with only three subsequent instances of 
industrial action. Meanwhile, 24% of cases saw balloting continue, action taken or continued. The 
remainder concerned either unknown outcomes or negotiated settlements. This success rate for 
employers compares favourably with that for applications and represents lower cost action. Grounds 
for threatening applications (n=92) comprised strikes notices (12%), trade disputes (3%), balloting 
issues (38%), others (unballoted and unlawful action) (19%), picketing (5%) and unknown (23%). By 
sector, transport (bus and rail especially) had less presence at 24% while communications (primarily 
newspapers and Royal Mail) recorded 21%, prisons 12%, central government 10%, local government 
9%, manufacturing 5% and education 8%. In terms of affected unions, Unite (and its predecessors, 
TGWU and Amicus) were subject of 24% of threats while media unions (BECTU, NUJ) experienced 
14%, UNISON public sector union 9%, Public and Commercial Services (PCS) union 8% with RMT and 
Aslef combined only being 10%. The differences between the respective sectoral concentrations of 
applications and threats to apply are accounted for by the methodology employed and by union 
ability to sustain industrial action. Thus, where threats were carried through this was recorded only 
in applications because the threats were acted upon, and few of unions outside RMT and Unite in 
transport have shown the willingness-cum-ability to continue with organising intended industrial 
action after receiving threats.  
 
Comparing 2005-2014 to 1995-2004, the outcomes, grounds and sectoral distribution for threatened 
applications were not substantially divergent and for similar reasons with the exceptions of a) 
increased concentration on balloting deficiencies as grounds; and b) decline in industrial conflict in 
Royal Mail. In 80% of cases where definite outcomes are known (n=35), employers gained a positive 
outcome for their interests (with 25% of these cases leading to reballoting but only one instance of 
industrial action then forthcoming). In the remaining cases, strikes or IASOS continued. Grounds for 
threatened applications (n=49) comprised strikes notices 18%, trade disputes 18%, balloting issues 
18%, others (unballoted and unlawful action) 18%, picketing 6% and unknown 18%. In terms of 
sectoral distribution, transport accounted for 27% (mostly rail) while media and entertainment 
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recorded 17%, prisons and Royal Mail 15% each, and the public sector (excluding prisons and Royal 
Mail) 19%.  
 
Of the relationship between threats to apply and applications themselves, there were just under a 
third more threats than applications between 2005 and 2014, and 72% of applications were 
preceded by identifiable threats. Between 1995 and 2004, there were more applications than 
threats. The threats were made directly in dispute negotiations, in media statements or in letters 
from employers’ lawyers to unions outside bargaining fora. The move from threat to application 
represents a continuation, through escalation, of employer action to prevent or stop industrial 
action (with a view to settlement of the dispute on employers’ terms), constituting an industrial 
relations, rather than legal, tactic. Not all injunctions were preceded by threats, not for reason of 
‘catching’ unions out but because in initiating proceedings to apply, notification prior to the 
application hearing is given and this serves as part of the threat process up until the hearing itself. 
The overall proportion of threats which do not lead to applications was 65% (for reasons cited 
above) suggesting most threats were taken seriously and effective.  
 
Picketing, secondary action and occupations 
 
The period 2005-2014 continued the trends established during 1995-2004 of a very low frequency of 
applications (and threats) concerning picketing and the continued absence of those concerning 
secondary action. This indicates the sustained decline in ‘effective’ picketing (defined as preventing 
the movement of goods, materials and workers into and out of workplaces) and the rise of ‘token’ 
picketing (signaling strike visibility to employers, media and public and opportunity for membership 
involvement). Seven applications existed during 1995-2004 (along with five threats thereof) with five 
applications (and one threat) for 2005-2014. Although the five applications concerned employer fear 
of pickets inducing significant numbers of (unballoted) employees to respect picketlines, it was 
notable employers in cases of mass picketing of distribution centres did not seek injunctions to end 
them. The absence of applications concerning secondary action reflects its virtual absence with 
previous occurrences at the likes of Royal Mail having dried up. The paucity of workplace 
occupations (Gall 2011) saw only three (eviction) applications to end such sit-ins. 
 
Self-regulation 
 
A third aspect to injunctions concerns self-regulation by unions as a result of their own perceived 
deficiencies to required conformance (especially in relation to case law developments). Thus, unions 
halted ballots, cancelled results or suspended intended actions through becoming aware of 
irregularities which may have provided grounds for employers to seek injunctions (and without the 
unions receiving threats employers might do so). Sixteen such cases were found from 1995-2004 
(Gall 2006:339). By contrast, there were fourteen cases during 2005-2014. In both periods, three 
quarters of cases resulted in reballoting. Whilst such instances are less likely to come to light 
because unions do not normally publicise their own mistakes and climb-downs so no firm conclusion 
can be drawn, such instances continue and benefit employers (even if merely to delay balloting and 
action so allow counter-preparations).  
 
Discussion 
 
The juxtaposition of low strike levels and relatively large number of applications and threats appears 
incongruous. The annual average strike frequency for 1995-2004 was 188 while being 143 for 2005-
2014 (and 614 for 1985-1994). There were on average 15.6 applications and threats per year for 
2005-2014 and 13 for 1995-2004. While the extent of balloting is one factor helping determine the 
size of the canvass upon which employers may act, it exists alongside others helping explain the 
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incongruity, being management style, union strategy and climate of industrial relations at 
organisational and sectoral levels. Notwithstanding paucity of data on employer motivation, strike 
effectiveness provides more immediate explanatory purchase for it focuses upon qualitative, not 
quantitative, dimensions of strikes and IASOS. While affected unions often claim there is ‘no right to 
strike’ after being injuncted, it is more accurate to suggest injunctions tend to undermine the right 
to effective strikes because the vast majority of intended and actual strikes and IASOS go 
unchallenged by employers (indicating others factors like management style, union strategy and 
industrial relations climates bear upon the willingness and ability to negotiate pre-strike resolutions 
and make contingency arrangements). Recalling 71% of applications and 57% of threats for 2005-
2014 were found in just three sectors (transport, communication and prisons) where the impact of 
action is immediate and significant, the primary reason most industrial action (especially strikes) 
does not attract applications or threats is because it does not pose serious disruptive threat to 
employer operations and revenue - even when there are high levels of unionisation and workplace 
organisation. This is as a result of being based upon one-day or two-day strikes or at most a series of 
one-day strikes over a period of some weeks. For 2005-2014, one-day strikes commonly accounted 
for around half of all strikes and when those lasting one or two-days are combined the proportion 
rises to around two thirds (Beardsmore 2006, Hale 2007-2010, ONS 2011-2015). Even though strike 
effectiveness is not merely a factor of strike length, most strikes do not then exert significant 
leverage, giving employers no compelling motivation to seek injunctive relief or threaten to do so.  
 
Thus, short strikes (one day, two days) which pose serious disruption are found in particular 
economic sectors or parts of the public sector like transport, communications, prisons and border 
security where the strike impact is immediate, considerable and few alternative services are 
available, and where strikes are targeted at time limited/specific events like sporting competitions or 
national holidays. Hence, a number of characteristics are evident. Goods or services are perishable 
for they are required on the day to avoid loss and disruption to employers and ‘lost’ revenue cannot 
easily be recouped subsequently. Workers hold strategic positions within organisations (and their 
work processes) because of high degrees of integration and inter-dependency whereby withholding 
labour has an immediate and disproportionate impact upon all an employer’s operations. Thus, 
operational processes are disproportionately reliant upon one group of workers which can create 
bottlenecks. In some cases (like prisons, Royal Mail and petrol supplies), external political pressure 
also exists to stop disruption to operations, further compelling employers to seek injunctions or 
threaten to do so. Scarcity of alternative workers to step in in order to maintain production of goods 
and service reifies these features. Such strikes represent two of the three sources of labour power 
(see Batstone 1988), these being disruptive capacity and labour scarcity. The third is political 
influence which public strikes are principally based upon. With little disruptive capacity or labour 
scarcity, coupled with inability to make strikes political ‘hot potatoes’ because of neo-liberalism’s 
hegemony amongst all mainstream political parties (especially former social democratic ones), 
strikes in the public sector do not commonly face injunctions (11%, n=65) although the threat to 
apply is more pronounced (29%, n=91). Counter-factually, it can be ventured seeking to injunct 
public sector strikes which have little disruptive capacity and display little labour scarcity risks 
unnecessarily transforming them into political ‘hot potatoes’.10 
 
However, strike effectiveness can only provide partial explanation of employer behaviour. It cannot 
explain, for example, why not all rail operators made applications or threatened to when faced with 
strikes nor why the same rail operator applied for or threatened an application on one occasion 
when faced with a strike but not on another.11 Given union strategy and vitality of union 
organisation within the rail industry can be taken as constants, management style (including 
strategic and tactical discretion) along with climates of industrial relations are likely to provide 
fruitful avenues for investigation. Similarly, strike effectiveness cannot explain why employers make 
threats and initiate applications at different stages in the collective bargaining process. For example, 
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some applications were made after industrial action began, suggesting scope for opportunity to 
apply was not identified until late in the day or industrial action was harder hitting than expected. 
These are issues of management intelligence. Finally, developments in case law have influenced 
management’s calculation of opportunities for the grounds for applying for injunctions or 
threatening to, thereby, providing employers with enhanced tools of legal recourse. 
 
Thus, between 2005 and 2014, domestic case law developments have further framed how 
employers and unions have acted by being variations on existing themes. Essentially, legal 
interpretations have widened the scope for awarding injunctions by increasing the difficulties for 
unions in seeking to comply with de facto revised requirements. These developments have taken 
place despite the reforms enacted by Labour governments which themselves sought to simplify 
some of the requirements with the effect of making them less onerous for unions (Simpson 2005). 
Among the most significant precedent-setting injunctions have been those granted to Royal Mail 
(2007), Metrobus (2008), EDF Energy Powerlink (2009), BA (2009, 2010), Network Rail (2010), and 
Milford Haven Port Authority (2010).12 These have primarily concerned whether it is the law’s letter 
or spirit that is used to judge applications in regard of i) reporting the number of workers, category 
and their locations; ii) margins (+/-) of error of those balloted; and iii) form of the required 
notifications. The trajectory until 2010-2011 was of judicial interpretation enforcing compliance with 
the letter of the law, even to the extent that mistakes, inaccuracies and deficiencies of no material 
effect on ballot outcomes were deemed valid grounds. But in successful appeals against the BA 
(2010) injunction and the Serco and London & Birmingham cases, some respite for unions was 
gained with the latter two cases ‘establish[ing], for the first time, the duty of the courts to take into 
account the unions' right to strike in international law, when applying or interpreting the statutory 
ballot notice provisions, and the nature and scope of the obligations they impose’ (Ewing 2011). 
However, respite was rather less fulsome than many lawyers hoped for (see e.g., Arthurs 2011) 
judged by the number of injunctions subsequently granted on the same grounds as before or the 
number of cases used to successfully threaten unions with (see Appendix 1 after the United Plastics 
and Closure case, and Appendix 2 after the Prison Service case). 
 
Comparison with Ireland 
 
Brief, concise comparative analysis, where other countries provide for employers seeking injunctions 
in industrial disputes, is fraught because of significant differences in both laws governing industrial 
action and systems of industrial relations. For example, while employers have gained injunctions 
against strikes in transport (air, rail and sea) in Australia and Germany, frequent, significant changes 
in regulating industrial action along with continuation of industrial awards, inter alia, in the former 
and significant restrictions on the right to strike within the period of bargaining agreements and the 
banning of strikes by civil servants, inter alia, in the latter make comparative analysis unproductive 
here. Indeed, comparison of legal regimes governing industrial action within the European Union 
(Warneck 2007) highlights the large array of significant differences. Thus, comparison with Ireland is 
productive in illuminating key features of the British system of regulating industrial action with 
regard to injunctions given broad, but not complete, similarity between the two.  
 
Historically, the framework for governing industrial action in both countries has been the Trade 
Union Disputes Act 1906. This introduced legal immunities for unions, not a positive right to strike. 
Although an independent state since 1922, Ireland did not establish its own salient legal framework 
until much later through the Industrial Relations Acts (1946, 1969, 1990).13 These introduced 
disputes resolution methods (e.g., the Labour Court) while the 1990 Act juridified immunities for 
unions taking industrial action by requiring pre-action secret ballots, prior notification of action to 
employers, and prevents ex parte injunctions where ballots and notification are adhered to. The 
1990 Act also established the Labour Relations Commission to further aid dispute resolution (while 
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the conciliation and arbitration service in Britain, ACAS, was stripped of what statutory powers of 
intervention it had). Social partnership, regulating wages rises throughout the economy, operated 
from 1987 to 2009 (with a weakened form existing in the public sector thereafter), and successive 
ineffective systems for gaining union recognition were introduced. In sum, there is substantial 
similarity with regard to the legal framework governing employers’ ability to apply for injunctions 
whilst concomitant the systems of industrial relations in both countries have diverged in several 
substantial aspects. Thus, variance in relative frequency of applications and significance of their 
outcomes is expected because whilst injunctive relief is available in both jurisdictions, in Ireland 
motivation to seek it differs along with other substantial recourses for dispute resolution being 
available.  
 
Before examining the data on injunctions in Ireland, establishing the size of the canvass on which 
they operate is necessary. While workforce sizes differed markedly by 2015 (Britain 31m, Ireland 
2m), union density followed the same trajectory, falling in Britain from 32% (1995) to 29% (2003) 
and 25% (2014) (BIS 2015). In Ireland, it fell from 46% (1994) to 38% (2003) and 28% (2014) 
(Sheehan and Farrelly 2015). Between 2004 and 2014, Irish private sector density fell from 27% to 
17% and from 69% to 64% in the public sector (with the latter accounting for a growing proportion 
of all members, namely, 40% to 55%). In Britain, the comparable figures are 17% to 14% in the 
private sector and 59% to 54% in the public sector (with the latter accounting for 57% to 58% of all 
members). OECD data records absolute membership at 0.5m (1999), 0.54m (2005) and 0.52m (2013) 
in Ireland and 7m, 6.7m and 6.5m respectively in Britain. Strike frequency in Ireland has fallen from 
above 30 per annum (pa) between 1990 and 2000 to far less than 30pa from 2001 with an average 
of 10pa between 2004 and 2014 (CSO, ILO). Meanwhile, in Britain, from 1990 to 2001 strike 
frequency fell from over 600pa to just under 200pa (Hale 2007).14 Table 1 shows further decline 
thereafter. Data on membership and strikes provide basic parameters for assessing the prevalence 
of injunctions (given strikes by non-union members are rare).15 By way of illustration, and in terms of 
current (2014/2015) workforce size (15:1), union membership (12:1) and strikes (14:1), Britain is 
greater by a factor of at least twelve.16 All other things being equal, this gives some guidance as to 
the expected level of in injunctions and the ratio to Britain.  
 
Using the same sources (quality press, specialist press like Industrial Relations News, union press 
releases) covering 1995-2004 and 2005-2014, 28 and 29 applications were made respectively. 
Compared to Britain, what stands out is the absence of decline while injunctions ran at over four 
times expected levels in both periods (6.5 and 5.4 injunctions respectively). Moreover, not all things 
were equal given social partnership and extensive dispute resolution means. The explanation for this 
disparity is found in grounds for applications (of which all but four were granted). In the respective 
periods, 71% (n=31) and 69% (n=29) concerned picketing (where a small number of applications 
cited more than one ground). In Ireland, picketing is far more commonly practiced because it is used 
effectively (with picketlines widely respected by other workers) and is aided by what is classified as 
‘secondary’, thus unlawful, picketing in Britain not being in Ireland. Case law holds lawful picketing 
can include premises from which employers conduct business other than strikers’ own workplaces. 
Unlike in Britain, picketing does require balloting so the common ground for employers seeking to 
injunct picketing is through challenging the veracity of the ballot. But other grounds include bona 
fide secondary picketing (including by affected third parties), intimidatory behaviour on picketlines 
and picketing by unballoted workers or non-employees. Yet because picketing does not require 
advanced notification, applications are made once it has begun and, with injunctions against 
picketing being time-limited, further court hearings are often occasioned where unions seek to 
restart picketing.17 The other side to explaining the prevalence of picketing injunctions is the paucity 
of injunctions over strikes and other forms of industrial action. In addition to injunctions against sit-
ins and occupations (n=6), very few strike ballots (n=8) were challenged between 1995 and 2014. 
Those that were mainly concerned air transport where striking would close down operations 
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(without picketing). This situation arises for four reasons. First, and contrasting markedly with 
Britain, the Industrial Relations Act 1990 ‘is essentially permissive [where] the decision [about] when 
and how to hold a ballot [is] … decided by the union's rules. The decision as to the question or 
questions that are to be asked is also that of the union; there is no requirement that only 
appropriate questions be asked’ (Kerr 1991:248). Thus, employers cannot easily interfere in what are 
considered to be internal union processes. Second, and following from this, it is the spirit, not the 
letter, of the law which holds sway, limiting latitude for precedents extending the scope of the law 
(O'Keefe 1998 cf. Kerr 1991:244). Third, the onus is on the defendant to establish it acted reasonably 
– not the plaintiff that the defendant acted unreasonably, with the effect that significant mistakes 
and errors are permissible. Fourth, where important case law precedents have been set – as in the 
Nolan Transport v SIPTU in 1998 (O'Keefe 1998) and notwithstanding the Crampton v BATU case 
(Irish Times 16 January 1998) – the outcomes have often favoured unions. 
 
While far fewer threats existed (13 from 1995-2014), similar to Britain, damages were seldom 
sought. Between 1995 and 2014, transport (mostly rail and bus) accounted for 26% and 
manufacturing 19% of injunctions, with the public sector (excluding transport) marked by its relative 
absence (7%) while construction accounted for 30% and private services 14%. Compared to Britain, 
transport was not nearly so dominant and construction was far more so, reflecting particularly the 
boom in construction and that picketing is the most effective tool workers have in this sector. Just 
over two thirds of injunctions concerned two unions (Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical 
Union (SIPTU) and Building and Allied Trades Union (BATU)) and of these two thirds concerned 
SIPTU). SIPTU is Ireland’s largest union, accounting for some 38% of all members, and organises in 
construction, health, education, transport and manufacturing.  
  
Conclusion 
 
Analysing the frequency, nature and outcomes of employer applications (and threats thereof) for 
injunctions in collective industrial disputes between 2005 and 2014 indicates employers recorded 
considerable success in preventing unions from attempting to gain leverage over them by using 
industrial action. Indeed, of known final outcomes of all the industrial disputes involving applications 
for injunctions and threats thereof, in only 16 cases did negotiations resolve the dispute, whereby 
resolution involved employer compromise so the vast majority of final outcomes favoured 
employers. This underscores employers’ ability to utilise, in the main, procedural violations to 
defend their substantive interests. The task of understanding the relative paucity of injunctions and 
threats thereof (vis-à-vis ballots producing mandates for industrial action) and their relative 
abundance (vis-à-vis number of strikes and the period 1995-2004) can be illuminated to a large 
degree by the notion of strike effectiveness. Comparative analysis highlights that in Ireland picketing 
is the most effective form of industrial action and the most vulnerable to injunctive relief with 
balloting for striking being more legally permissive. It also highlights these two states have not 
sought to ban strikes (alongside imposing compulsory arbitration) as some others have in ‘essential 
services’ like transport and communications. Rather, the ability - and not right - to strike has been 
made conditional upon fulfilling a number of requirements.  
 
Future research can determine whether the trends identified during 2005-2014 were maintained, 
accelerated or altered by the Trade Union Bill - will its changes obviate employer ‘need’ for 
injunctive relief (because mandates are not gained) and provide new latitude for injunctive relief 
where thresholds are met (especially with regard to picketing)? Considerable union and sectoral 
variation is anticipated. For example, while the RMT in overground rail transport is likely to be little 
affected, it would be in underground rail and bus transport, with firefighters’ experiencing similar 
variation and large public sector unions likely to be particularly affected (Darlington and Dobson 
2015). With the Trade Union Bill, the trajectory Britain has taken since 1979 becomes an ever more 
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idiosyncratic route to restricting industrial action in general and specific (i.e., public and essential 
services) terms compared to countries which have outlawed strikes in certain sectors (post, prisons, 
transport) but put compulsory arbitration in their place for dispute resolution. The benefit to capital 
and the neo-liberal state in Britain of the Trade Union Bill is that by effectively allowing unions to 
restrict their own right to take industrial action, no alternative such means of dispute resolution 
need be offered.       
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Notes 
 
1 The periods 1995-2005 and 1980-1995 were analysed by Gall (2006) and Gall and McKay (1996) 
respectively. The analysis for 1995-2005 ended in August 2005. In order to examine full years and 
not exclude September to December 2005, this article covers 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2014.  
2
 A trade dispute is a dispute between workers and their employer(s) over the terms, conditions and 
matters of employment. It was constructed so as to exempt ‘political’ strikes where there is no 
dispute with the employer or where the dispute is with the government. 
3
 There is some protection for workers taking part in officially sanctioned and lawfully organised 
strike and industrial action such as protection from unfair dismissal for up to twelve weeks and a ban 
on the supply of agency staff to provide replacement workers. However, such industrial action still 
constitutes a breach of civil contract and the punitive measures against employers breaching these 
rights are generally not held to be significant.   
4 Similarly, it is exceptional for employers to seek damages and compensation from unions should 
industrial action lose immunity.  
5 The British and Irish Legal Information Institute (BAILII) is the main repository of available case law. 
However, many judgments on injunctions are not written up and published so BAILII’s holdings are 
relatively small. 
6 Only a few lawyers representing unions were willing to enter into correspondence so this means 
could not be used to adequately examine employer motives. As with n3, paucity of available written 
decisions as well as court transcripts did not ameliorate this.  
7 A precise proportion is difficult to ascertain because while most ballots cover both striking and 
IASOS, and unions often deploy both, employer ire is usually targeted against strikes.  
8 The majority (two thirds) of cases of reballoting took place within the transport sector, reinforcing 
the notion of ‘strike effectiveness’. 
9
 The same was true over picketing in the 2011-2012 BESNA dispute. 
10 Given that the number of ballots organised (as a result of the fragmentation of employer 
structures) and the numbers covered in these bargaining groups is substantial, there will have been 
more than ample latitude to seek injunctions, and especially so when the criteria are meeting the 
letter, not spirit, of the law. This was very much so for the 30 November 2011 public sector general 
strike over pension reform. 
11 Moreover, specific to the train operating companies is the ability to apply for state funding to 
reimburse ‘lost’ revenue on strike days. 
12 In granting injunctions (BA (2009), Network Rail), courts discussed ‘proportionality’ whereby, it 
was argued, likely passenger disruption brought into question the right to take action. However, this 
argument was not a ground for granting the injunctions and has yet to be revisited in subsequent 
cases.  
13 As the focus is upon injunctions against unions, injunctions against pickets themselves are not 
included. 
14 Minimums thresholds for inclusion are similar: in Ireland stoppages lasting at least one day with 
the total time lost 10 or more days and in Britain stoppages involving 10 or more workers and lasting 
one day or more unless the number of days lost is 100 or more. 
15 For Ireland, neither data on the frequency of IASOS nor ballots for industrial action is available.  
16 Between 2005 and 2014 with regard to number of strikes, the ratio was 17:1. 
17 In a few cases, picketers were jailed for contempt of court for failing to desist. 
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Table 1: Strikes and ballots for strikes and IASOS, 2002-2014 
 
Year  
Strike ballots 
(success rate) 
Strikes IASOS ballots (success rate) 
2002 613 (83%) 146 519 (97%) 
2003 684 (83%) 133 601 (94%) 
2004 762 (83%) 130 709 (93%) 
2005 663 (85%) 116 562 (93%) 
2006 1083 (84%) 158 541 (94%) 
2007 634 (89%) 142 555 (95%) 
2008 660 (84%) 144 559 (93%) 
2009 460 (82%) 98 435 (93%) 
2010 488 (88%) 92 399 (97%) 
2011 906 (94%) 149 388 (97%) 
2012 585 (83%) 131 366 (97%) 
2013 469 (89%) 114 318 (88%) 
2014 628 (87%) 155 368 (89%) 
Totals 8635 1708 6320  
Averages 664 (86%) 131 486 (94%) 
Source: ONS (2012, 2015). 
Note: Comparable figures for ballots for strikes and IASOS before 2002 and after 2011 are not 
available. With the former period, extant figures suggest numbers may have risen since the 1990s 
(Gall and Cohen 2013:98-102). Figures for cases of IASOS are not available but are likely to have 
fallen in line with those of strikes, being less frequent on an annual basis than strikes (Gall and 
Cohen 2013:91-94). 
 
 
Table 2: Employer applications, and threats of applications, for injunctions, 2005–2014  
 
 Year Applications  Threats of applications 
2005 4 10 
2006 4 14  
2007 7 8 
2008 5 8 
2009 11 13 
2010 14 10 
2011 6 10 
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2012 5 9 
2013 5 4 
2014  4 6 
Totals 65 92 
Source: see methodology. 
Note: If the specific reason included in the threat becomes the basis of the heard application, only 
the latter instance is recorded. If, however, the reasoning in the threat is different from that heard in 
the application, both are recorded.  
 
 
Appendix 1: Employer applications for injunctions, 2005-2014 
 
Organisation Date Industrial 
sector 
Union(s) 
involved 
Basis of application Outcome where known 
Trinity Mirror  
 
2005 Newspapers NUJ Strike notice Granted, further strikes 
called off, union 
reballoted 
Central Trains 2005 Railways RMT Balloting  Refused, strikes 
continued 
Midland Mainline 2005 Railways RMT Ballot rendered 
unlawful by unofficial 
action  
Granted  
 
Gate Gourmet 2005 Air transport TGWU Picketing and 
demonstrating 
Granted on picketing 
Mackinnon 2006 Textiles Community Picketing Refused, picketing 
continued 
South West Trains 2006 Railways Aslef Ballot paper Granted, union 
reballoted 
Prison Service 2006 Prisons POA Warders in Liverpool 
had no right to take 
lawful strike action 
despite balloting  
Granted 
Prison Service 2006 Prisons POA Action of union 
circular urging 
members not to work 
overtime amounted 
to industrial action 
and was as such 
unlawful  
Application for hearing 
stopped as government 
withdrew application  
East London Bus 
Group 
2007 Transport TGWU Balloting  Granted, strike cancelled 
Royal Mail 2007 Communicat
-ion 
CWU Ballot notice Granted, ballot cancelled 
Prison Service 2007 Prisons POA Action amounted to 
industrial action and 
was as such unlawful 
Granted, union 
instructions stood down 
concerning overtime  
Anglian Home 
Improvements 
2007 Manufactur-
ing 
GMB Balloting, strike 
notice, number of 
ballots 
Refused, strikes took 
place  
Explorer Group 2007 Vehicles GMB Balloting, others Refused, strikes took 
place 
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Prison Service  2007 Prisons POA Legally binding no-
strike agreement 
broken 
Granted, strike 
continued but ended 
early  
Bernard Matthews 2007 Food 
processing 
Unite Balloting  Judge dismissed 
application as 
negotiations led union to 
acknowledge errors and 
call off strike  
South Eastern 
Trains 
2008 Railways RMT Ballot notice Union called off strike 
before application 
hearing began so 
application withdrawn 
Metrobus 2008 Transport Unite Ballot, ballot result 
and strike notice 
Granted, second day of 
discontinuous strike 
cancelled  
First Hampshire 2008 Transport Unite Notice of action Granted, union 
reballoted 
Royal Mail  2008 Communicat
ions 
CWU Ballot notice Granted, strike cancelled 
Royal Mail  2008 Communicat
ions 
CWU Terms of ballot Granted, strike cancelled 
Royal Mail 2009 Communicat
ions 
CWU Ballot notice (for 
three London offices) 
Granted, strikes 
cancelled 
First Bus (South 
Yorkshire) 
2009 Transport Unite Unknown Refused, right of appeal 
refused, strike went 
ahead as planned  
Royal Mail 2009 Communicat
ions 
CWU Unknown (for London 
office) 
Refused  
East Midland 
Trains 
2009 Transport Aslef Unballoted industrial 
action  
Granted, action 
continued  
First Bus 
(Potteries) 
2009 Transport Unite Balloting  Granted  
EDF Energy 
Powerlink 
2009 Transport RMT Balloting  Granted, union 
reballoted, strike action 
taken  
First Bus  2009 Transport Unite Unknown Refused  
Metrobus 2009 Transport Unite Ballot notice, result 
notice 
Granted, appeal rejected  
Virgin Trains 2009 Transport RMT Balloting  Granted, union 
reballoted  
McBrides 2009 Manufacturi
ng 
GMB Unknown Refused, strike went 
ahead  
BA 2009 Transport Unite Balloting  Granted, union 
reballoted  
First London buses 2010 Transport Unite Strike mandate 
invalid 
Granted, strike cancelled 
Tesco 2010 Supermarket Unite Ballot notice, result 
notice 
Granted  
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Milford Haven 
Port Authority 
2010 Transport Unite Strike notice Granted, strike 
cancelled, new strike 
scheduled but 
negotiations led to its 
standing down and 
agreement, injunction 
overturned on appeal 
Arriva Buses 
Wales 
2010 Transport Unite Unknown Refused, strike cancelled 
as a result of further 
successful negotiations  
Network Rail  2010 Transport RMT Balloting  Granted, union 
reballoted  
Prison Service 2010 Prisons POA Action amounted to 
industrial action and 
as such unlawful 
Application adjourned 
after undertaking 
received from POA 
Johnston Press 2010 Newspapers NUJ Trade dispute  Granted, strike 
cancelled, union 
reballoted  
Culture and Sport 
Glasgow  
2010 Local 
government 
Bectu, GMB, 
Unite, 
Unison 
Picketing Granted but strikes 
continued 
BA 2010 Transport Unite Deficiencies in notice 
to members  
Granted, strike 
reinstated upon 
successful appeal against 
injunction  
Tube Lines 2010 Transport RMT Balloting  Refused, negotiations 
resolved dispute  
Omagh Meats 2010 Food 
processing 
Unite Unknown Granted  
London Fire and 
Emergency 
Planning Authority 
2010 Fire and 
rescue 
FBU Picketing Granted, strike stood 
down 
Midland London 2010 Transport Aslef Balloting Granted, strike 
cancelled, overturned on 
appeal, negotiations 
resolved dispute  
London 
Underground 
2010 Transport Aslef Balloting  Refused, strike went 
ahead  
Serco  2011 Transport  RMT Ballot notice Granted, strike stood 
down, overturned on 
appeal  
Arriva Trains 
Wales 
2011 Transport RMT Balloting  Strike cancelled before 
application heard, union 
announced would hold 
new ballot  
United Closures 
and Plastics 
 
2011 Manufacturi
ng 
Unite Balloting  Refused, strikes went 
ahead  
Centrepoint 2011 Housing 
charity 
Unite Balloting  Union reballoted 
members, strike then 
called off after 
negotiations led to 
agreement  
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Warrington 
Borough 
Transport 
2011 Transport Unite Balloting, trade 
dispute 
Strike stood down  
London 
Underground 
2011 Transport Aslef Balloting – non-
involved workers 
balloted  
Refused, strike went 
ahead  
Balfour Beatty 
Engineering 
Services 
2012 Electrical 
contracting 
Unite Balloting  Refused, negotiations 
then led to agreement  
Caterers Offshore 
Trade Association 
2012 Offshore oil 
and gas 
RMT, Unite Ballot notification Refused, Unite members 
voted against striking 
and RMT members, 
which voted to strike, 
were not prepared to 
strike on their own  
Arriva Shires/Go 
Ahead London 
General/Metroline 
2012 Bus 
transport 
Unite Balloting and ballot 
notification  
Granted, strike 
proceeded in 17 other 
bus companies, 
members reballoted in 3 
companies, union 
appealed  
Home Office 2012 Civil service PCS Balloting Withdrawn immediately 
before application heard 
when strike called off  
Arriva North 2012 Bus 
transport 
Unite Balloting Refused, strike went 
ahead  
Home Office 2013 Civil service 
(border 
agencies) 
PCS Balloting Strike stood down before 
application heard  
Future Directions 2013 Care sector Unison Strike notice  Granted and strike stood 
down but after re-
notification strikes held  
Royal Mail 2013 Communicat
ions 
CWU Unballoted action CWU undertook not to 
induce members to take 
industrial action in 
reliance upon a 
consultative ballot  
East Midlands 
Trains 
2013 Rail 
transport 
RMT Mandate for IASOS 
exceeded as action 
constituted strike 
action  
Refused, IASSOS 
continued, appeal won 
and some forms of IASOS 
withdrawn, negotiations 
led to acceptable 
compromise to union  
CityLink 2013 Road 
transport 
RMT Balloting Application stood down 
as RMT withdrew notice 
of strike, reballoting 
undertaken. 
Lambeth College 2014 Education UCU Against all out strike 
but one day went 
ahead 
Granted, reballoted on 
all out action, ballot won 
and action taken  
Glasgow Life  2014 Leisure 
services 
Unison Unballoted action 
(picketing in 
worktime)  
Refused as protest not 
found to be picketing in 
worktime  
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Association of 
Colleges/Westmin
ster Kingsway 
College 
2014 Further 
education in 
England  
UCU Ballot mandate 
expired  
Strike stood down  
ISS (Woolwich 
hospital) 
2014 NHS GMB Unknown  Refused, strikes 
continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Employer threats of application for injunctions, 2005-2014.  
 
Organisation Date Industrial 
sector 
Union(s) 
involved 
Basis of possible 
application 
Outcome  
ANSA Logistics 2005 Road 
transport 
TGWU Secondary action/ 
secondary picketing 
 
Threat not acted upon, 
action continued 
 
BA 2005 Air transport TGWU Secondary 
action/unofficial 
action 
 
Threat not acted upon, 
action ended 
 
BBC 2005 Broadcasting BECTU, NUJ Secondary picketing  Picketing withdrawn 
 
Express 
Newspapers 
2005 Newspapers  Balloting  Threat withdrawn, strike 
went ahead 
 
South London 
Guardian 
2005 Newspapers NUJ Secondary picketing  Threat not acted upon, 
strikes continued 
 
Watson Steel 2005 Construction  Amicus Unballoted, unofficial 
action 
 
Overtime ban 
withdrawn, action ended 
 
Grampian Country 
Food 
2005 Food 
processing 
T&G Balloting  Strike stood down, 
reballot led to strike  
HSBC 2005 Finance Amicus Balloting  Planned strike stood 
down  
Independent 
Newspapers 
2005 Media  NUJ Ballot notice Reballoted 
Department of 
Work and 
Pensions 
2005 Central 
government 
PCS Balloting  Reballoted 
Scottish Media 
Group 
2006 Media NUJ Strike notice Reballoted 
Royal Mail 2006 Communicat
-ions 
CWU Unofficial action 
supported by union  
Repudiation 
South West Trains 2006 Transport ASLEF Unlawful action Unknown 
Guardian 
Newspapers  
2006 Media NUJ Notice Reballoted 
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Guardian 
Newspapers  
2006 Media NUJ Notice Reballoted 
 
Asda 2006 Retail GMB Balloting  Planned strike stood 
down  
Babcock Defence 
Services 
2006 Defence Amicus Unknown Outcome unknown  
Coventry City 
Council 
2006 Local 
government  
Unison  Unknown Strike action cancelled, 
reballoted  
Royal Mail 2006 Communicat
-ions 
CWU Unballoted strike Repudiation 
Prison Service  2006 Prisons  POA Unballoted action Industrial action stood 
down  
Prison Service  2006 Prisons  POA Unballoted action Industrial action stood 
down  
Virgin Rail 2006 Transport RMT Balloting  Strike action stood down  
Prison Service  2006 Prisons  POA Unballoted action  Strike action stood down  
Prison Service  2006 Prisons  POA Unballoted action 
over job evaluation 
scheme 
Instructions withdrawn 
Northern Trains 2007 Railways Aslef Unknown Settlement to dispute so 
strike action stood down  
Scottish Prison 
Service 
2007 Prisons POA Unballoted strike Strike action stood down  
Prison Service 
(England and 
Wales) 
2007 Prisons  POA Unballoted action Industrial action stood 
down  
Oxford City 
Council 
2007 Local 
government 
TGWU Picketing Strikes continued, 
picketing discontinued  
London 
Underground 
2007 Transport RMT Unballoted strike Strike action stood down  
Glasgow City 
Council 
2007 Local 
government 
Unison Balloting  Work-to-rule stood 
down, strike ballot 
conducted  
Prison Service  
(England and 
Wales) 
2007 Prisons POA No right to strike Outcome unknown  
Prison Service 
(England and 
Wales) 
2007 Prisons POA No right to strike  Strike continued, 
application applied for 
(see above) 
BA 2008 Transport BALPA Strike would 
contravene EU 
competition law 
Strike action not taken  
Telegraph Media 
Group 
2008 Newspapers NUJ Trade dispute  Outcome unknown  
British Library  2008 Civil service PCS Unspecified threat Ballot continued 
Cabinet Office 2008 Civil service  PCS Unspecified threat Ballot continued 
Non-
Departmental 
Public Body 
2008 Civil service PCS Unspecified threat Ballot continued 
Non-
Departmental 
Public Body 
2008 Civil service  PCS Unspecified threat Ballot continued 
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Non-
Departmental 
Public Body 
2008 Civil service  PCS Unspecified threat Ballot continued 
First Group, 
Arriva, Metroline, 
East London Buses 
and East Thames 
Buses 
2008 Transport Unite Ballot notice Second day of planned 
strike action stood down  
People’s Printing 
Press Society 
2009 Newspapers NUJ Unspecified Balloting process 
continued, strikes took 
place 
London Midland 2009 Railways RMT Strike notice  Strike days cancelled and 
rescheduled, strike 
action continued  
London 
Underground 
2009 Railways RMT Strike notice  Strike ballot re-run, 
negotiations resolved 
dispute  
Department of 
Education 
2009 Schools NUT Unlawful action Outcome unknown  
UCEA (on behalf 
of 78 universities) 
2009 Education UCU Balloting Ballot suspended and 
not re-run  
Royal Mail 2009 Communicat
-ions 
CWU Balloting  Negotiations resolved 
dispute  
ECIA (on behalf of 
members) 
2009 Construction  Unite, GMB Balloting  Negotiations resolved 
dispute  
Pinewood Studios 2009 Media BECTU Strike notice Strike cancelled  
London 
Metropolitan 
University 
2009 Higher 
education 
Unison Strike notice Strike cancelled and 
rescheduled  
Pinewood Studios 2009 Media BECTU Ballot notice Strike ballot cancelled 
and not re-run  
BA 2009 Transport  Unite Unspecified threat Ballot and strike dates 
set 
Virgin Trains 2009 Transport TSSA Unknown Strike cancelled, new 
ballot held  
BA 2009 Transport  Unite Balloting Strike preparations 
continued 
Fujitsu 2010 IT Unite Strike notice Threat to apply for 
injunction withdrawn, 
strikes continued 
Tesco 2010 Supermarket Unite Balloting  Action stood down 
Manchester 
Metropolitan 
University 
2010 Education Unison Balloting  Ballot suspended, 
reballoted  
Department for 
Children, Schools 
and Families 
2010 Education NAHT, NUT Trade dispute  Action went ahead  
BA 2010 Transport Unite Mandate does not 
cover new issues  
Union announced would 
hold new ballot  
Tube Lines 2010 Transport  Aslef Balloting  Negotiations resolved 
dispute  
BT  2010 Communicat
ions 
CWU Balloting  Ballot cancelled, 
negotiations resolved 
dispute  
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Mirror Group 
Newspapers 
2010 Communicat
ions 
BAJ Balloting  Outcome unknown  
UK Border Agency 2010 State 
security 
ISU Unspecified Strike cancelled  
Glasgow City 
Building 
2010 Local 
government  
Unite Unspecified Strike ballot cancelled 
Great Western 
Ambulance 
Service 
2011 Health 
service 
Unison Industrial action 
notice 
Industrial action stood 
down but notice re-
issued, negotiations 
resolved dispute  
BA 2011 Transport Unite Trade dispute and 
balloting  
New ballot organised  
London 
Underground 
2011 Transport RMT Balloting  New ballot organised  
John Port School  2011 Education NASUWT Unspecified  Strike action continued  
Prison Service) 2011 Prisons POA No lawful right to 
take industrial action 
No strike took place  
Dingle secondary 
school, Liverpool 
2011 Education NASWUT, 
NUT 
Unballoted industrial 
action 
Outcome unknown  
Burtons 2011 Food 
production 
BFAWU Balloting  Reballoting intended but 
negotiations resolved 
dispute  
Barnet Council 2011 Local 
government 
Unison Unspecified Application not 
proceeded with, strike 
went ahead  
Balfour Beatty 
Engineering 
Services 
2011 Electrical 
contracting 
Unite Balloting  Union reballoted  
Prison Service 2011 Prisons POA No lawful right to 
take industrial action 
Work time union 
meetings went ahead as 
planned  
Highlands and 
Islands Airports 
Ltd 
2012 Transport Prospect Balloting  Reballoting led to strike 
mandate but 
negotiations resolved 
dispute  
Primark 2012 Retailing USDAW Strike notice Reballoting led to new 
strike mandate but 
negotiations resolved 
dispute  
Greenwich Leisure 2012 Leisure 
services 
Unite Unknown Strike proceeded. 
Sixth Form 
Colleges Forum 
2012 Education 
(Sixth form 
colleges 
outside 
London in 
England) 
NUT Ballot paper and 
notice  
Strike called off 
(although London strike 
not challenged) 
Hoyer 2012 Transport Unite Balloting Reballoted, returning 
vote for IASOS but not 
for strike action  
Prison Service  2012 Prisons  POA Unballoted action  Strike action stood down  
Greater Anglia 2012 Transport RMT Balloting  Ballot stood down  
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Remploy 2012 Manufacturi
ng 
GMB, UNITE Balloting  Action delayed for a 
week  
Ministry of Justice 2012 Civil service PCS Deficiencies in 
balloting process 
Strike action stood 
down. Re-balloted and 
took strike action.  
Royal Mail 2013 Communicat
ions 
CWU Unlawful action Several threats made in 
May and June 2013 over 
boycott of non-Royal 
Mail users of network 
University of 
Sussex 
2013 Education  Pop-Up 
Union 
Balloting  Union cancelled ballot  
Newsquest 2013 Newspapers NUJ Strike notice 
(company name, 
notification period)  
Union successfully 
reballoted for strike 
action  
Glasgow City 
Council 
2013 Social care Unison Failure to repudiate 
unofficial strike 
Outcome unknown  
Fusion Lifestyle 2014 Leisure Unite Balloting process Reballoted members and 
took strike action  
First Glasgow 2014 Transport Unite Ballot notice Reballoted members, 
negotiations resolved 
dispute  
Glasgow Life  2014 Leisure 
services 
Unison Strike notice Strike stood down. No 
reballot  
Council of Scottish 
Local Authorities 
2014 Local 
government 
Unison Balloting  Revised pay offer led to 
strike being stood down  
Lambeth College 2014 Further 
education 
UCU New terms of offered 
for agreement 
requiring new ballot  
Ballot suspended, new 
ballot organized and 
strike action taken  
National Gallery 2014 Arts PCS Basis of mandate Strikes stood down. 
Reballoted, strikes taken. 
 
 
 
